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== Subject:     Samba buffer overflow vulnerabilities on 32-bit
==              systems
==
== CVE ID#:     CVE-2022-42898
==
== Versions:    All versions of Samba prior to 4.15.next, 4.16.next, 4.17.next
==
== Summary:     Samba's Kerberos libraries and AD DC failed to guard
==              against integer overflows when parsing a PAC on a 32-bit
==              system, which allowed an attacker with a forged PAC to
==              corrupt the heap.
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===========
Description
===========

The Kerberos libraries used by Samba provide a mechanism for
authenticating a user or service by means of tickets that can contain
Privilege Attribute Certificates (PACs).

Both the Heimdal and MIT Kerberos libraries, and so the embedded
Heimdal shipped by Samba suffer from an integer multiplication
overflow when calculating how many bytes to allocate for a buffer for
the parsed PAC.

On a 32-bit system an overflow allows placement of 16-byte chunks of
entirely attacker- controlled data.

(Because the user's control over this calculation is limited to an
unsigned 32-bit value, 64-bit systems are not impacted).

The server most vulnerable is the  KDC, as it will parse an
attacker-controlled PAC in the S4U2Proxy handler.

The secondary risk is to Kerberos-enabled file server installations in
a non-AD realm.  A non-AD Heimdal KDC controlling such a realm may
pass on an attacker-controlled PAC within the service ticket.

==================
Patch Availability
==================

Patches addressing these issues have been posted to:

    https://www.samba.org/samba/security/

Additionally, Samba 4.15.next, 4.16.next, and 4.17.next have been issued
as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are
advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon
as possible.

==================
CVSSv3 calculation
==================

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L (6.4)

==========================
Workaround and mitigations
==========================

* No workaround on 32-bit systems as an AD DC
* file servers are only impacted if in a non-AD domain
* 64-bit systems are not exploitable.

=======
Credits
=======

Originally reported by Greg Hudson with the aid of oss-fuzz.

Patches provided by Nicolas Williams of Heimdal and Joseph Sutton of
Catlyst and the Samba team.

Advisory by Joseph Sutton and Andrew Bartlett of Catalyst and the
Samba Team based on text and analysis by Greg Hudson.

==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
==========================================================